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Abstract—In this work, we leverage advances in decentralized
identifiers and permissioned blockchains to build a flexible user
authentication and authorization mechanism that offers enhanced
privacy, achieves fast revocation, and supports distributed “policy
decision points” executed in mutually untrusted entities. The
proposed solution can be applied in multi-tenant “IoT hubs” that
interconnect diverse IoT silos and enable authorization of “guest”
users, i.e., opportunistic users that have no trust relationship with
the system, which has not encountered or known them before.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things (IoT) emerges it becomes clear
that it departs from the traditional networking architectures.
IoT devices are deprived from computational power, have
limited connection capabilities, and in many use cases they are
physically exposed (hence more vulnerable). For these reasons,
in most IoT systems users do not interact directly with the
IoT devices, instead their communication is mediated by a
more powerful gateway. Nevertheless, gateways and devices
are usually bundled into the silo of a specific manufacturer.
What is worse, these silos are vertical and not interoperable.
The need for interoperability, e.g., among home IoT systems,
has fostered a new type of IoT devices, usually referred to as
IoT hubs. IoT hubs, such as Amazon’s echo and Google’s
home, allow users to interact with multiple IoT gateways
through a single device (the hub) using a unified interface.
It is evident that traditional authentication and authoriza-
tion systems cannot be applied in this environment. Indeed,
recently, He et al. [1] pinpointed the need for novel access
control mechanisms for the IoT that will handle these new
entities and trust relationships, taking at the same time into
consideration users’ context, as well as properties of the users’
environment. To this end, we design and build an IoT access
control solution that supports authorization of opportunistic
users, referred to as guests, with rapid revocation and enables
the evaluation of complex access control policies by mutually
untrusted entities. In order to achieve our goal we leverage
recent advances in decentralized identifiers and permissioned
blockchain technologies.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
Our solution considers the architecture depicted in Figure 1.
In this architecture there is a user, referred to as the owner,
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Fig. 1. Our reference IoT architecture
who interacts with IoT gateways through an IoT hub. Each
gateway and the hub have their own authentication and au-
thorization systems; hence the owner has an “account” in all
these systems. Furthermore, the owner has “linked” the hub
account with all other accounts using OAuth [2] (or any other
similar protocol). In other words, the owner has authorized the
IoT hub to communicate with the IoT gateways on his behalf.
Our system achieves the following:
• Guests can interact with the IoT gateways through the
hub.
• Guests cannot be tracked when interacting with hubs
belonging to different owners.
• Guests’ access rights can be easily modified/removed.
• Gateways do not have to be modified.
Our system relies on Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) for
guest authentication. A DID is a new type of identifier that is
globally unique, resolvable with high availability, and crypto-
graphically verifiable [3]. From a high level perspective a DID
system can be viewed as a key-value storage system, where
the key is the DID and the value is a DID document. DID
documents can be stored in blockchains, distributed ledgers,
(decentralized) P2P networks, or other systems with similar
capabilities; these systems are referred to as Decentralized
Identifier Registries (but we simply refer to them as registries).
DID documents contain (among other information) pubic keys
that can be used for linking a user to particular DID document
(using an “authentication” that depends on the type of the
public key), service endpoints, as well as auxiliary information
that can be used for verifying the integrity of the document [4].
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2III. SIMPLE USER AUTHORIZATION
In our system we assume a secure DID registry which is
trusted and can be accessed at least by the owners and the
hubs. Furthermore, we assume that each owner is associated
with a DID (DIDowner), known to the hub, and mapped to
a public key (Powner) used for singing the DID documents
of the guests. A guest wishing to access an IoT resource
through a hub must initially create a public-private keypair and
securely transmit the public key Pguest to the owner. Then, the
owner generates a DID (DIDguest), a DID document, signs
the document and stores it in the registry, and sends back the
DID to the guest. The DID document contains Pguest and
the corresponding authentication method, the URIs of the IoT
resources the guest can access, as well as an expiration time.
IoT resource access (by a guest) is a two-step process:
firstly, the guest is authenticated and authorized and secondly
the guest invokes the appropriate hub API function. Guest
authentication and authorization is implemented as follows.
Initially, the guest sends to the hub her DIDguest. Then,
the hub, retrieves the corresponding DID document from the
registry, checks if it has been signed by DIDowner, verifies
that the document is still active, and retrieves Pguest. As a
next step the hub executes the authentication method that
corresponds to the type of Pguest.
IV. AUTHORIZATION DELEGATION
Our first construction albeit it can be useful for simple use
cases it cannot easily accommodate cases that require complex
access control policies or cases where IoT hubs are not trusted
by guests to evaluate a policy. These problems stem from the
fact that in our first model the IoT hub holds both the role of
the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and of the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) [5]. With the approach we present in this section
we separate these two functionalities and we assign to the IoT
hub only the role of the PEP.
In our authorization delegation solution we model access
control policies as a function, which accepts arbitrary inputs
(e.g., a resource URI, a DIDguest, context related informa-
tion) and outputs a Boolean value, which indicates if the
authorization procedures was successful, and (optionally) a
timestamp that defines the validity period of the response.
These functions are identified by a URI and they can be
invoked using remote procedure calls; we refer to this URI
as PolicyURI . Supposedly that there is a PDP trusted by both
the owner and the guest, then our solution can be easily im-
plemented using access control delegation mechanisms (e.g.,
similar to [6]). However, if this is not the case then the PDP
can be implemented as a distributed process where all policy
decisions are collected to a single point and the final access
control decision is made upon consensus. In this work we
consider the latter approach, i.e., we support multiple PDPs
that all, at the same time, execute the same policy, and the final
output is decided based on a pre-defined consensus algorithm.
It should be noted that the IoT hub is oblivious about the
access control decision process: from its perspective the PDP
decision is received by making a single remote procedure call.
Similar to our simple authorization construction, IoT re-
source access involves guest authentication, authorization,
and API invocation. When authorization delegation is used,
the guest authorization process is modified as follows. The
first time a guest requests access to an IoT resource, the
hub performs a remote procedure call to the corresponding
PolicyURI (found in the DID document), receives, and stores
the result: If the result of this call is positive then the guest is
considered authorized to access the requested resource.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We propose an access control solution for modern IoT
systems. Our solution leverages decentralized identifiers and
permissioned blockchains to facilitate controlled access by
“guest” users. Our designs are tracking-resistant, they facilitate
revocation, and allow fine-grained access control decisions,
even by mutually untrusted entities. With our solution, guests
are granted access to IoT gateways only through a particular
device, i.e., the IoT hub. This contributes to the security of
our approach, since guests cannot access IoT gateways/devices
directly, as well as to its deployability, since no modification
to gateways is required.
We implemented a proof of concept DID registry and a
distributed PDP using Hyperledger Fabric. Fabric is a private,
permissioned blockchain technology, i.e., a blockchain system
where membership is controlled. Fabric involves no monetary
cost, low computational complexity, and insignificant delay.
All DID-related cryptographic operations require less than
25 ms, even if they are executed in a mobile device. Fur-
thermore, all registry operations and access control decisions
implemented in Fabric are executed in less than 50 ms, apart
from the DID creation process that requires 2.500 ms.
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